Fig. 1. In August 1955
Volkswagen celebrated the production of the millionth Beetle, which rolled off the production line painted all in gold. This image was intended to convey the social unity at VW as managers and workers gather around the symbol of the 'economic miracle'. . This ad from the early '60s coined a phrase that has entered colloquial German. It praises the Beetle's sturdy reliability as the cause of its phenomenal success, proclaiming 'it runs and runs and runs' ('und la¨uft . . .').
That slightly incredulous reference to Wehler's staying power was not the only the allusion to Volkswagen's fabled product. As Wehler denounced the GDR's repressive politics, praised the stability and wealth of the Federal Republic and warned against rising social disparities in unified Germany, a central inset photograph from 1957 provided a light-hearted counterpoint to his observations. It depicted a family picnicking peacefully in the sunshine of a forest clearing in front of their parked VW -an idyllic scene invoking the simple pleasures of incipient affluence in West Germany. Running and resting, work and leisure, production and consumption -these themes can readily be summoned up by alluding to the Volkswagen Beetle. The circumstance that neither Wehler nor his interviewers ever mentioned the vehicle in their conversation was by no means unusual. 1 Volkswagen's most famous product has been called upon as a symbol of the Federal Republic with such frequency and regularity that it seems superfluous to Germans to spell out how exactly this automobile stands for the postwar order. Former West Germans in particular see in the Beetle much more than yet another car. To them it is a much-loved, multi-layered and uncontroversial icon of the Federal Republic.
That this car would secure such prominence in postwar German culture was by no means a foregone conclusion. Like many a popular material object, the Beetle has taken numerous twists and turns over its long life as a commodity from Nazi Germany to the present. Rather than remaining a merely functional object, the car came to articulate and communicate a broad range of sentiments that, given its prominence, highlight key aspects of West German collective identity. A large number of people including politicians, engineers, line workers, management executives, advertising agents, car dealers and, last but not least, countless ordinary drivers played important roles in making this vehicle an exceptional success that gained symbolic significance despite inauspicious beginnings. 2 In 1945 the Volkswagen was burdened by its origins in the Third Reich, an ambivalent legacy that might well have obstructed its adoption as the new republic's talisman. Both in Germany and abroad, it was common knowledge that the car's main design features -its round shape, its torsion-bar wheel suspension, its air-cooled rear engine -stemmed from the 1930s. It was also well known that Ferdinand Porsche had secured Hitler's support to develop an inexpensive, robust family vehicle as part of the dictator's plans to advance mass motorization so as to demonstrate National Socialism's purported commitment to creating a classless, racially pure 'national community [promoted as the Volksgemeinschaft]' in the sphere of consumption. Finally, it was common knowledge that the Nazi regime had financed and constructed VW's factory in Wolfsburg, Europe's largest auto plant intended to buttress portrayals of Nazi Germany as a powerful, highly productive and technologically modern country on a par with the United States. 3 After 1945, the Beetle more than any other automobile pushed ahead mass motorization in the Federal Republic, turning the dream of individual car ownership into a reality for millions during the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, with more than twenty-one million sales worldwide, VW's export success helped restore West Germany on the global economic stage. From this perspective, the Beetle signalled both the achievements of postwar reconstruction and the country's integration into a new international order. Still, how a product that began life as a National Socialist prestige project came to be adopted by Germans as a symbol of the postwar order remains an open question. 4 Despite the intimate links with the Nazi dictatorship, the Volkswagen and its production site provided a collective marker of West Germany from the earliest postwar days. No period of critical detachment or uncomfortable silence preceded the Volkswagen's public embrace after 1945. In 1949, the year of the Federal Republic's foundation, a photo-book entitled Kleiner Wagen auf großer Fahrt (Small Car on a Big Journey) already extolled car and factory as 'the most convincing emblem [Sinnbild] ' for 'the genuine values of this country and this people'. 5 Assessments along these lines are a staple of public commentary to this day. When Spiegel TV produced a documentary on Germany's socio-economic difficulties in 2005, it chose to interview several generations of Volkswagen workers in Wolfsburg, assuming that the city still offers noteworthy indicators of national trends even after unification. 6 With its long-standing eminence the Volkswagen presents a promising focus for a study of how West Germans made sense of their new country and its place in the world. This article approaches the topic through two lines of inquiry. First, it examines how the West German public assessed the Beetle in a domestic context where the car emerged as a symbol of dynamic reconstruction during the 1950s and 1960s. With its phenomenal commercial success, the Beetle struck contemporary observers as the quintessential embodiment of the values West Germans embraced as they rebuilt their ruined country. But commentators by no means ignored the Volkswagen's origins in the Third Reich. Tales about the Beetle reveal how contemporaries imagined the relationship between the Third Reich and the Federal Republic, positing links and ruptures between both. Recent work has emphasized that in the 1950s and 1960s West Germans frequently viewed themselves as history's victims rather than its perpetrators, as a result of Allied bombing as well as mass expulsions and rape at the Second World War's end. 7 Still, it remains unclear how they came to embrace their new state as a success and how they connected this success to the recent past. 8 Second, West Germans never saw the Volkswagen in exclusively domestic terms. Its global appeal made an important contribution to its iconic status. West Germans attentively followed how the Volkswagen turned into a sales hit abroad, registering with relief the affection it inspired in countries near and far. They viewed the car as their unofficial, yet prominent representative on the international stage. It was a source of collective pride that the 'Wirtschaftswunder [economic miracle]' of the 1950s and 1960s rested on foreign demand for German goods, generating self-congratulatory celebrations of the new republic as an 'Exportweltmeister [export world champion]'. The Beetle's proliferation signalled to West Germans that their country had left behind its pariah status and become part of the international community. Few industrial products have matched this car's lasting attractiveness in highly varied markets across the globe. As early as the mid 1950s, it emerged as the most popular import vehicle in the United States, a position it retained into the early 1970s. After the collapse of the US market during the oil crisis of the 1970s, the car's career took off during mass motorization in Mexico, where VW has maintained a large plant in Puebla since 1967. In 1993 annual production of the automotive classic in Puebla peaked at almost 100,000 cars. 9 As news of the vehicle's fortunes in foreign lands filtered back to the Federal Republic it established among citizens of the Federal Republic a view of their country's place in the world that, as we shall see, was as selective as it was self-flattering. As a symbol of the 'export miracle' the Volkswagen contributed to a very partial understanding of the country's international role which continues to reverberate in current German debates about globalization.
The following pages examine the Volkswagen Beetle in domestic and international context, accounting for the vehicle's rise to continuing symbolic eminence in Germany. Three aspects uncover how the interplay between domestic and international dimensions lent the Beetle exceptional prominence in the German imagination. To begin with, VW emerged as an icon of West German postwar reconstruction. Moreover, the car's surprising popularity in the USA signalled to German observers their country's return to the wider world. Finally, Volkswagen's activities in Mexico demonstrate the German public's reluctance to acknowledge their country's role in processes of economic globalization. By bringing into view how the German public has positioned itself vis-a`-vis the past, the success of the Federal Republic as well as its place in the wider world, this study allows us to probe core elements of postwar collective identity. As we shall see, the Beetle embodies a very specific notion of normality that has proved as durable as the car itself.
A SYMBOL OF THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE: 'NECESSITY TURNED INTO A VIRTUE' Having produced armaments and military vehicles during the war, the Volkswagen works survived the immediate postwar years intact because British authorities began car production at Wolfsburg to alleviate a serious vehicle shortage in their occupation sector. Although the British motor industry identified the German vehicle as a potentially powerful competitor, plans to transfer the facilities from Wolfsburg to Britain failed because of divisions between government departments in Whitehall as well as the difficulty of accommodating a factory that would dwarf all car plants in the UK. 10 13 The city of Wolfsburg -Volkswagen's corporate headquarters to this day -loomed large in the Beetle's iconography in the postwar years. Situated in agrarian countryside less than ten miles west of the border with the GDR, and previously known as City of the Strength-Through-Joy Car (Stadt des KdF-Wagens), Wolfsburg gained its name -from a nearby medieval castleduring the period of British administration. Since plans to accommodate factory workers in a new model town had been halted in 1939, at the war's end the place consisted mainly of a large, partly bombed-out factory building, numerous cramped barracks for forced labour and a few solid residential dwellings. As the post-war factory prospered and the population rose (to 58,000 by 1958), a construction boom remedied dramatic housing shortages and established an urban infrastructure.
14 With its disproportionately large number of German refugees from eastern Europe, Wolfsburg struck visitors as emblematic of the wider social reconstruction apparently underway in the early Federal Republic. Heinz Todtmann's Kleiner Wagen auf großer Fahrt (Small Car on a Big Journey, 1949) was among the first publications to comment on Wolfsburg as a city where people 'stranded from all areas and strata . . . made a virtue of necessity' by creating a new 'type' of community (Gemeinschaft) in which 'nothing counts as much as achievement [Leistung] '. Seeking to 'prove how serious they are about thoroughly learning anew and rebuilding decently', Todtmann went on, Wolfsburg's inhabitants embraced an ethos of achievement that provided the basis for a 'raw and roughly hewn . . . form of democracy' born out of 'existential need and necessity'. 15 Although Todtmann never specified what concept of democracy he had in mind, his assessment that hard work turned Wolfsburg into a noteworthy social experiment became a familiar theme in contemporary writing. The topic loomed as large in Horst Mo¨nnich's novel Die Autostadt (The Car City, 1951), an instant bestseller, which attracted Heinrich Nordhoff's praise for 'truths that lie deeper than the surface'. Journalists too, expressed admiration for the 'proud' workers, who 'saw their chance' in Wolfsburg and 'rolled up their sleeves'. 16 Hard work and dedication, public consensus had it, put the company in a position not only to prosper but also to offer its workforce safe jobs that, from 1950 on, paid the highest wages and benefits in West Germany. 17 Moreover, Volkswagen's local taxes financed the transformation of a temporary barrack settlement into a medium-sized city, whose inhabitants enjoyed up-to-date infrastructure, state-of-the-art housing, new schools and other amenities. In 1957, a conservative weekly pointed out that the company 'has done much for the well-being and the health' of Wolfsburg's inhabitants. 18 Such accolades derived partly from tightly planned publicrelations initiatives, through which Volkswagen trumpeted its triumphs. In 1955, the management ensured that no fewer than 1,200 journalists were on site to cover the spectacular celebrations marking the production of the one millionth Beetle. This 'extravaganza in honour of the economic miracle [wirtschaftswunderbare Kostbarkeit]', as one reporter put it, comprised three hours of performances, including ladies from the Moulin Rouge in Paris, South African gospel choirs and Scottish female dancers, before 100,000 spectators; it culminated in a lottery in which Nordhoff magnanimously distributed fifty-one Beetles among the employees. An address by Nordhoff concluded the festivities and ended characteristically with a rallying cry for a new production target: 'And now on to the next million!' 19 As a self-confident site of disciplined industrial production whose economic success under a patriarchal leader brought the workforce material benefits and fuelled urban development, Wolfsburg and its factory provided a social microcosm that rendered visible to contemporary observers what West Germany's economics minister Ludwig Erhard termed the 'social market economy'. According to this concept, the state's role was to establish a political order that protected free enterprise, encouraged entrepreneurship with a sense of social responsibility, expanded property ownership among the wider population and put in place social safeguards for the weak. 20 Despite its significance for economic politicians, for the wider public the concept remained rather nebulous and enigmatic throughout most of the 1950s. Trends in Wolfsburg, however, demonstrated in concrete terms that the boom did benefit citizens across the social spectrum, even as elsewhere the new republic continued to suffer from persistent unemployment and poverty into the second half of the 1950s. Volkswagen and Wolfsburg offered not only an example of recovery but also a promise of future prosperity. Erhard himself did much to encourage this view. In the run-up to the 1957 Federal elections, for instance, he floated a highly popular scheme to complement public ownership of Volkswagen with an issue of 'people's shares [Volksaktien] ' in order to spread 'co-ownership [of the company] to the man in the street'. 21 It was, of course, the car Wolfsburg produced that most potently embodied the promise of prosperity. In the 1950s, a prospect with an almost utopian appeal began to appear on the horizon: universal car ownership. The number of passenger cars in West Germany increased from 515,608 to 8,630,240 between 1950 and 1965. Demand from the middle classes, whose real incomes doubled in the 1950s, was fuelling a process of mass motorization and signalled the beginnings of affluence, even if was it still limited by material constraints. 22 In 1956, for instance, vehicles costing under DM 5,000 made up almost two thirds of all new registrations.
23 While a range of automobiles including Borgward's 'Lloyd' (DM 3,850), the 'Goggomobil' (DM 3,280) and BMW's bubble car 'Isetta' (DM 3,890) conveyed, in Werner Abelshauser's words, the 'social well-being, . . . the sense of liberty . . . and the social prestige' of car ownership, no model even remotely approached the popular Volkswagen, with its market share of over a third during the 1950s. 24 At DM 4,600 the VW cost more than some of its competitors, but it offered the best investment in the small-vehicle market. Test reports in the West German automotive press consistently praised the car for combining 'economy and power during operation, modernity in technical design, and meticulous finishing'. Requiring little maintenance and few repairs, the Volkswagen was deemed 'the best car on the [German] market', because it proved cheap to operate in the long term. Even when journalists admitted in the second half of the 1950s that the Beetle was no longer the 'most modern car' they remained impressed by its 'economy' and 'indestructibility'. 25 Beyond highlighting the financial strictures under which the German economic miracle unfolded, the emphasis on the vehicle's thrift and reliability developed wider cultural resonance. The Volkswagen's success, argued the company, reflected a normative framework that lent stability to the postwar order. VW went to great lengths to position its product as a measure of sobriety and solidity. Like industrial design products, the Volkswagen exerted a strong appeal in West Germany because its plain appearance contrasted starkly with National Socialism's brash promises and the chaos of war. 26 At the beginning of the 1950s Heinrich Nordhoff maintained that a new landscape of desire stood behind the Volkswagen's rise to prominence. Forced to turn 'necessity into a virtue' after the war, he declared (resorting to Todtmann's phrase), 'people in Germany [had] become realistic'. 'Rather than the primitive which we came to despise the more the accursed war forced it upon us, we revere the useful and serviceable [das Nu¨tzliche und Zweckma¨ßige], the truly progressive.' 27 Detaching the automobile from the Nazi era, Nordhoff linked his product to values like moderation and utility, which, in his reading, dominated the culture of the postwar era. Gute Fahrt (Safe Journey), VW's monthly magazine for Volkswagen owners, took up this theme. It welcomed the postwar years for restoring 'real values gradually to the place they deserved'. The small car from Wolfsburg appealed because of its consistency and trustworthiness. It was 'true to itself and to its friends', and so signalled a 'normalization of life'. 28 The Beetle's virtues, according to VW's own PR, thus stood for new, stable form of normality that ordinary people could rely on.
The company's efforts to identify the Volkswagen with new peacetime normality struck a chord among the wider population. Through its ubiquity, the Beetle gave values like thrift and dependability a pervasive and visible presence in West German culture. In the late 1950s, when journalists declared the model technically dated and began lobbying Volkswagen for a replacement, the citizens of the Federal Republic fervently defended it as a much-loved token of stability. 29 One aficionado used the most conventional idiom of loyalty and obedient companionship available to middleclass man: 'I like [my Volkswagen] like a dog on the street corner with its faithful eyes'. 30 Such affection was rooted, as another devotee pointed out, in the car's absolute dependability. 'How light-heartedly one drives it, how strongly one trusts it! . . . This trustworthiness is a guarantee that VW-drivers' nerves will be spared as much stress as possible -a very important consideration in our hectic times.'
31 Statements along these lines were more than mere expressions of private attachment; they highlight what Eckart Conze has termed a 'need for compensatory stability' that ran through many spheres of life in the early Federal Republic. 32 The Volkswagen was material proof that the achievements of the 1950s rested on solid, reliable foundations.
That this automotive symbol of the postwar order had its origins in the Third Reich was common knowledge. West Germans, however, held on to a politically sanitized interpretation of Volkswagen in the Third Reich which disconnected the car from National Socialist ideology, regarding it as an unpolitical legacy of the immediate past. While journalists celebrated the reliability and endurance of the so-called 'Ku¨belwagen', the military vehicle based on the Beetle design which the VW works had mass-produced during the war, they never mentioned the wartime abuse of forced labour in Wolfsburg. 33 Praise for the 'Ku¨bel' reflected a collective denial of the Wehrmacht's participation in atrocities and emphasized the supposedly honourable conduct of the Germans on the battlefield. 34 Beyond the 'Ku¨belwagen' the public conviction that the Volkswagen emerged untainted from the Nazi era gained its strongest expression from the erstwhile members of the official Third Reich savings scheme who had paid up to 1,000 Reichsmark into a savings account administered by National Socialist organization Strength Through Joy (Kraft durch Freude, or KdF). Of course, the members of this scheme had never received a single vehicle. Under the leadership of retired salesman and former party member Karl Stolz, 40,000 of the 'VW-Savers (Volkswagensparer)' set up an association to demand compensation for their investment loss after the war. Although it represented only a fraction of the more than 300,000 people who had joined the scheme before 1945, the association's activities attracted considerable interest for more than a decade. In 1949 Stolz initiated what evolved into the young republic's largest civil suit, which by 1961 had generated no fewer than eight verdicts on all three levels of the civil-court circuit. To press its case, the savers' association remained consistently silent about the vision of a classless national community of consumers that had ideologically underpinned the Volkswagen project in the 1930s. Instead Stolz and his association insisted that joining the NSDAP-run instalment scheme had not amounted to a political act. Both members and non-members of the party, Stolz declared time and again, had paid money into the scheme to secure a car: 'Drawing attention to the political side is an irrelevance'. 35 Moreover, the association characterized its clientele as ordinary, average people. Most Volkswagen savers, Stolz wrote, were 'industrious, hard-working and thrifty people' from 'nonpropertied circles' who had lost 'their hard-earned money'. 36 By placing virtues such as thrift, hard work and self-denial in the foreground, the association identified its members as apolitical savers who could see themselves as 'most badly deceived' and blameless victims. 37 Not even when Stolz encouraged his followers to wear on their lapel small round badges which combined black, silver and red did the similarity with the colour, shape and placing of the former Nazi party badge trigger public comment on the political leanings of VW-savers. 38 As it strove to present its members as apolitical, the savers' association benefited from the position taken by the Volkswagen works. The Volkswagen corporation, for obvious PR reasons, did not emphasize the Nazi regime's role in founding the Wolfsburg works, thereby leaving uncontested the political claims of the savers' association. Notwithstanding their legal conflict, the savers and Volkswagen inadvertently colluded to downplay the ideological contours of the Volkswagen scheme in the Third Reich. Widespread consensus as to the supposedly apolitical origins of the Volkswagen not only explains the positive public response to the substantial compensation won by the savers in 1961; 39 it also renders intelligible the ease with which the little car from Wolfsburg turned into a symbol of postwar normality. For the Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung this automobile was an 'emblem of German diligence, reliabilityand flexibility'; it was not an object weighed down by ideological ballast. 40 Only indirectly did a sense that National Socialism had left a problematic moral legacy affect the Volkswagen as a postwar icon. As a result of mass motorization, the number of people killed in road accidents in West Germany rose from 8,800 to almost 13,000 between 1952 and 1956. 41 The ensuing discussion on the causes of this increase, which was to persist into the mid 1970s, raised the question whether car owners could be trusted to operate their vehicles responsibly or whether the state had the duty to enforce road discipline through stringent traffic laws. The issue of traffic regulation triggered controversies in parliament and press about the relationship between state, civil society and the individual, with strong historical overtones. Since excessive speed was one of the most frequent source of fatalities, speed restrictions were a sensitive topic and provoked a robust lobby demanding 'free roads for free citizens'. The introduction of speed limits meant modifying a 1952 Federal Law that had removed restrictions previously imposed by the Nazi regime to save fuel for the wartime economy. Re-establishing speed limits -a process that began in 1957 -reminded at least one journalist of Nazi laws. 42 Unsurprisingly, state officials were deeply reluctant to advocate a political measure that recalled regulatory practices of the Third Reich.
Moreover, comprehensive speed limits suggested that politicians had doubts whether West German drivers possessed the character traits to enjoy the freedom of the road. In the early 1950s, this topic was much on people's minds. German travellers returned from trips abroad impressed by the courtesy with which drivers encountered each other elsewhere. Rather than better roads, one passionate car lover wrote in 1953, the explanation for lower accident rates was 'that the French driver is more polite and considerate in the same way that the English driver is polite and considerate'. German roads, by comparison, resembled wartime battlefields: 'Whenever I take a journey, I feel as if I'm off to the front. You never know whether you will get back home safe and sound'. 43 In this reading mass motorization revealed a deficit in civility among West Germans, who continued to display behaviour they had supposedly learned in times of war. Here, then, a moral legacy of the Third Reich was exposed. Suspicions about the suitability of the national character for mass motorization re-surfaced as late as the 1960s. 'Are Volkswagen drivers reckless [gemeingefa¨hrlich]?' asked one journalist in 1963. 44 Despite the Volkswagen's paramount contribution to West German mass motorization, its reputation did not suffer from the controversies about traffic safety. After all, this debate centred on individual conduct. While public exchanges might reveal unease about behavioural consequences of the recent past, they never focused on the vehicles people drove. Since automobiles' safety features were not subject to public scrutiny, technical flaws that contributed to hazards on the road did not come into view during the 1950s. Car traffic was widely acknowledged as a pervasive public danger, but contemporaries identified drivers rather than cars as its source. The Volkswagen Beetle thus retained its aura as a friend with an unproblematic pedigree whose reliability assured the West German public that good times had come to stay.
'A GOOD GERMAN': THE BEETLE AS ICON OF EXPORT SUCCESS
If the Volkswagen functioned as an icon in the Federal Republic, it gained this status not only for embodying the advent of postwar normality but for leading an export drive that commanded domestic and international attention. On the assumption that the West German market alone would ultimately prove too small to support the Volkswagen corporation, general director Heinrich Nordhoff took an early strategic decision to develop sales abroad. The management had succeeded in turning the business into an export concern by 1955, when annual international sales (177,657) first overtook the number of vehicles delivered to the domestic market (150,397). 45 The United States became the most significant export destination. Annual Beetle sales in the US stood at a meagre 887 in 1953, but by 1955 they had risen to about 32,000 and in 1959 they reached 120,422. 46 By then, VW had secured the largest share of export vehicles on the US market.
The success of this car with a Nazi past in a former enemy country within a decade of the war's end had many causes. Attempts to sell the vehicle in the United States immediately after the war had failed in part because of raw memories of recent hostilities. In the early 1950s, Germany's status as a former war enemy began to be replaced among American politicians and the wider public, not least due to persistent public-relations efforts on the part the government in Bonn, which ran an extensive visiting scheme for US-journalists. West Germany came to be seen as a Cold-War ally first and foremost, and a former dictatorship and adversary second. 47 Once the cultural hurdle of its Nazi pedigree had been surmounted, the car recommended itself through its quality, which Nordhoff had boosted in the late 1940s in particular to enhance VW's competitiveness in export markets. At the beginning of the 1950s, his strategy began to pay off. In November 1951 America's leading car magazine, Road and Track, praised the 'deutschkraftwagen' for its 'light weight and good balance [that] produced road-holding gratifying the most fastidious'. A year later, this magazine found that 'it is difficult to attach negative criticism to the little Volkswagen'. 48 The American public was equally taken with the engineering that went into the car, because its quality saved owners from expensive repairs. Together with a high resale value and a modest purchase price ($1,547 in 1956), the car's low maintenance costs added to the appeal. And when their car did require an inspection or fixing, Volkswagen drivers profited from Nordhoff's foresight in establishing a tight network of dealerships offering their services at comparatively moderate rates.
Here was a small, efficient, practical and cheap car -and it entered a boisterous postwar market. After decades of national austerity caused by the Depression and prolonged by the Second World War, Americans were out on a spending spree that lasted until the late 1950s. The auto sector was particularly dynamic because the expansion of suburbs all over the USA created additional demand for means of individual transport. The Beetle proved particularly attractive among white middle-class families in the suburbs who required a handy, reliable and economical second car for everyday use. Detroit targeted this market segment only in the late 1950s, when it launched the so-called 'compact cars'. While US-made compacts squeezed out most other European competition, they matched the Beetle neither in price nor quality. As a consequence, this German import managed to defend and expand its position in the USA, reaching annual sales of 423,000 in 1968. 49 In a market where far larger automobiles set the standard, part of the Beetle's appeal derived from what American drivers considered its unconventional oddity. 50 The West German press followed the Beetle's American progress closely. German observers emphasized that the attributes of reliability and quality, which had rendered the company a synonym for national recovery at home, commanded respect in the USA, too. They repeatedly pointed out that Americans praised the car for its dependability as well as its moderate maintenance and repair costs. 51 Reports along these lines construed the car's appeal in the United States in terms that were eminently familiar to German readers, implying that VW's dedication to hard work and high production standards offered a promising example for returning Germany to the international scene. These news items not only suggested to West Germans that their culture shared crucial values with the United States in the realm of consumption; it also showed them that Americans took their new ally seriously because they valued the Beetle as a product of substance. In fact, few developments provided better evidence to the West German public of their country's recovery than Volkswagen's prominence on the much-vaunted American market.
At the same time, German writers noted that Americans regarded the Beetle as an unusual and peculiar vehicle -a 'different' car, a 'thing with zip [Ding mit Pfiff]'. 52 Its appeal among the 'technical and cultural intelligentsia' also caught their eye. 53 The Beetle's appeal in the middle class indicated two things to German observers. First, the car made inroads into a socially prestigious segment of the market. Second, its increasing presence on American roads and highways resulted from its ability to attract discerning, self-confident consumers. 'These people know who they are. They do not need a big car to look like more than they are', a German provincial paper pontificated. 54 Rather than attracting drivers susceptible to hype, this reading implied, the car appealed to self-assured customers supposedly devoid of status anxiety. These owners, German readers learned, loved their vehicles despite the taunts about its size and shape that marked out the 'volks' as a slightly bizarre motor. Its reputation as mildly wacky also predisposed the Beetle for lead roles in 'cults and pranks [Kult und Ulk]', which German journalists reported with bemusement. 55 More than one subtext ran through accounts of the Beetle as an unorthodox quality product. One was that the Beetle's humorous reception counteracted Germany's mixed reputation, persistently burdened by a 'dark atmosphere of the uncanny [Ruch des Unheimlichen]', as a leading weekly magazine put it twenty years after the war's end. 56 Another was pride in having secured a prominent presence in everyday American culture through a product that convinced through charm and unpretentiousness. Satisfaction at achieving success through a smart, simple commodity went hand in hand with a notably sober tone in German coverage. German criticisms of America as a car society of excess were very uncommon. Even rarer were statements that played on the well-established stereotype of American cultural inferiority vis-a`-vis the Old World. The Spiegel's claim in 1965 that Americans were only now discovering the 'VW-feeling' that the 'Germans had long outgrown' offered an exceptional insight into notions of German cultural superiority. 57 More representative was the storyline by a journalist who dismissed as an exaggeration the management assertion that the Beetle had become 'a part of America', and settled on the more modest claim that one 'cannot imagine America's roads without the Volkswagen'. He thought it was sufficient to say that the Beetle 'revives the somewhat faded shine of the label 'Made in Germany'. 58 A reticent tone that steered clear of triumphalism marked the coverage of VW's strength in the American marketplace.
Since West Germans cherished the Volkswagen as a symbol of their country, such comments did more than reflect upon the Beetle as an international commodity. They also helped to shape how Germans viewed their own place in the world. In line with wider attempts to show that the Federal Republic had rejected the fantasies of global domination that had motivated the Nazis, German writers were reluctant to trumpet postwar international achievement in triumphalist terms. 'The Beetle is a good German', an illustrated weekly magazine found, as it reflected on the reasons for the car's worldwide proliferation. 59 The reserved responses to the Beetle's transatlantic popularity corresponded with the 'style of modesty' that West German diplomats abroad adopted from the 1950s. 60 Beyond reassuring West Germans that the Beetle projected an unthreatening international presence, the car also suggested acceptance by the Federal Republic of a subordinate position vis-a`-vis the United States. Delighted as he was to see a series of Volkswagens speed across Times Square on a summer evening in 1965, a German visitor reminded himself that VW had a market share of only three per cent in the US, although the company exported one third of its production across the Atlantic. 61 Despite America's economic importance for VW, the article made it clear that the Beetle remained a niche product across the Atlantic. As they acknowledged the USA's undisputed Western leadership, observers from the Federal Republic assigned to the selfproclaimed 'export world-champion' a secondary role in the world economy. Loveable, reliable, modest, unorthodox and small -these antonyms of Germany's previous behaviour in international affairs shone strongly through reports about the Beetle in the United States. They signalled how, despite their dynamic, rapid economic ascent, West Germans wished to be perceived on the international stage. The Beetle, then, met a profound desire to compensate for Germany's tarnished reputation in the world. By analogy with the small car itself, the West German public imagined the Federal Republic as a small country with strictly limited power.
'THE GERMANS GO OFF WITH THE MONEY WE HAVE EARNED': VOLKSWAGEN IN MEXICO If the Beetle owes its iconic status in the Federal Republic to sales abroad, the car continues to sparkle in the German imagination because less salubrious aspects of its product history have failed to leave an imprint on public awareness. Like all symbols, the Beetle derives its symbolic salience as much from what remains unsaid about it as from what is said. As we have seen, motifs presenting the Beetle as endearing and harmless are central to its iconography. Aggressive overtones are conspicuous by their absence in its early public appearances. Beyond publicly detaching the vehicle's origins from National Socialist ideology, the marginalizing and downplaying of Volkswagen's increasing power in the global economy have effectively cloaked the car in apparent harmlessness.
Thanks to profits from its best-known product, Volkswagen developed into a major international automotive player from the late 1950s. While in the United States it did not rise from the secondary level, it established dominance in many a significant emerging market. In Mexico, as in some other countries, strong Beetle sales enabled VW to gain and defend a leading position from the 1970s to 1990s. Here Volkswagen was by no means an underdog. Moreover, its Mexican production site in Puebla has steadily gained prominence in Volkswagen's global corporate strategy since the 1970s. After Wolfsburg began to make the Golf in the mid 1970s, Puebla gradually became the main plant manufacturing the Beetle. While VW maintained Beetle production in Mexico until 2003, some of its business and management practices were distinctly aggressive. But if the contentious nature of Volkswagen's Mexican operations had the potential to mar the Beetle's image as a friendly machine, it left not a scratch on the car's iconic body in West Germany.
Volkswagen entered the Mexican market through a subsidiary in 1954 and opened a comprehensive production plant for Beetles in Puebla in 1967. The company invested more than DM 330 million in this Central American nation because, with growth rates averaging over seven per cent between 1963 and 1971, Mexico was seen to be pursuing a highly promising development strategy. 62 Praising the country for political stability and steady economic growth, the German press went so far as to label Mexico the 'Japan of Latin America' in 1966. 63 This positive coverage reflected wider optimistic assessments of the economic policies initiated by the government of the left-leaning Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI) from the 1950s. The PRI pursued a strategy of 'import-substituting industrialization' that, beyond strengthening the agrarian sector through land reform, aimed to establish a dynamic manufacturing sector behind high tariff walls so as to reduce dependence on foreign imports. 64 Mexican officials identified the auto sector as a key industry for their developmental drive, decreeing in 1962 that car manufacturers must produce at least sixty per cent of the parts for their vehicles locally if they wished to maintain their sales presence in the country. To secure a foothold in what it deemed a lucrative future market, VW erected in Puebla a sizeable production plant featuring a training centre, a foundry, a paintshop and assembly lines which by the early 1970s employed between 8,000 and 12,000 workers. 65 The Beetle became Mexico's leading car with a market share rising from twenty-five to thirty-two per cent between the late 1960s and early 1970s. While German diplomats and VW's managers were delighted that this product enjoyed exceptional popularity, executives in Wolfsburg criticized Puebla for low productivity and agonized over the plant's losses in the early 1970s.
66
Beyond an expanding market, a cheap workforce as well as employerfriendly legal arrangements for industrial relations attracted Volkswagen to Mexico. The PRI, which all but monopolized state power between 1946 and 2000, exerted extensive influence over industrial relations through its trade union arm, the Confederacio´n de Trabajadores Mexicanos (Confederation of Mexican Workers). This proved particularly important during conflicts over pay and labour conditions. If disagreements between workers and employers could not be resolved, they were referred to an arbitration board under the authority of the Ministry of Labour, which tended to rule in employers' favour. In the early 1970s, however, this system of industrial relations broke down amid protests by assembly-line workers in Puebla who charged trade-union officials with indifference to their concerns, collusion with the management and corruption. Against this background VW workers set up one of the country's few independent trade unions, defending their strengthened bargaining position throughout a series of severe economic crises which threw Mexico into turmoil during the Eighties. 67 As production of the Beetle continued into the new millennium, industrial relations at the plant remained tense. Although locals considered themselves lucky to secure work at VW in Puebla, comparatively high wages and benefits did not prevent repeated conflict. 68 As part of its strategy to integrate global manufacturing operations more closely, Volkswagen sought to introduce organizational changes in work processes aimed at raising productivity in Puebla from levels that had stayed below international norms all through the 1980s. Moreover, the management strove to cut the wage and benefits bill. In an economic environment where levels of annual inflation periodically exceeded 140 per cent, such measures predictably triggered industrial strife that culminated in lengthy strikes, violent protests, and mass redundancies.
Despite their recurrent and protracted nature, the clashes between Volkswagen and its Mexican workers remained marginal and even opaque in the mainstream media of the Federal Republic. When employers and workers in Puebla began to thrash out a wage settlement after more than seven weeks of work stoppages in the summer of 1987, the leading conservative-liberal daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) chose to report that the management had 'predictably' rejected demands for wage increases of 100%. The company had now tabled an offer of thirty per cent, the article went on, while the trade union had lowered its negotiating position to seventy per cent. Within a German context such figures were bound to appear excessive, but the account failed to point out that annual inflation in Mexico was running at 120 per cent. The claim in the article's concluding paragraph that VW headquarters in Wolfsburg had begun to criticize local managers for their 'headstrong' tactics received no further explanation. 69 This report displayed as little interest in workers' living and employment conditions as did a piece five years later informing German readers that, in reaction to a minority wildcat strike, the local management had locked out all 14,000 employees with the aim of making them redundant. 70 FAZ coverage of events in Puebla thus provided little context.
Readers seeking to understand the local dynamics between management and workers in Puebla had to turn to tageszeitung, a left-leaning daily sympathetic to economic critiques of neocolonialism. This publication pointed out in 1987 that the management had opened negotiations with demands for a fifteen per cent pay cut despite high inflation and annual profits of DM 200 million. Personnel costs, the report added, amounted to no more than ten per cent of overall expenditure, not least since average daily wages stood at a mere DM 12. 71 The newspaper also emphasized that the sense of frustration behind protest actions like the blocking of a motorway and threats to occupy VW showrooms extended beyond issues of pay.
72 Lack of protective clothing such as leather gloves as well as VW's unwillingness to provide affordable daycare for children were among workers' grievances. 73 When the paper related VW's conduct in Puebla to employment standards in the Federal Republic, the company emerged in a distinctly unflattering light. While a manager stated that wages and benefits in Puebla were twice as high as at other Mexican car plants, tageszeitung relativized this assertion by commenting that VW's Mexican workers earned 'less per day than West German VW-workers in an hour'. 74 Moreover, the company's decision in the summer of 1992 to fire its entire workforce of 14,000 was a measure whose ruthlessness was 'inconceivable in German enterprises'. 75 Interviews with employees revealed considerable distrust of the German management. One female assembly-line worker summed up her view of the situation in the following manner: 'The Germans supposedly come to teach us something but in reality they just go off with the money we have earned '. 76 Tense industrial relations in Puebla received no mention during President Weizsa¨cker's state visit to Mexico in November 1992. When Weizsa¨cker toured the company's production site as an example of German-Mexican co-operation, reporters stereotypically proclaimed relations between both countries to be as cloudless as the sky over Mexico. 77 That German criticism of Volkswagen's business practices in the late 1980s and early 1990s emerged only in a newspaper harbouring suspicions about global capitalism as a matter of principle is not particularly surprising. However, silence on this topic in the mainstream media indirectly stabilized the Beetle as an icon in Germany. Large parts of the German public remained unaware that VW's Latin American operations relied on methods that were within Mexican law but would have been entirely illegal in the Federal Republic. While ignorance about its practices abroad protected the company's domestic reputation as an exemplary employer, silence about animosity between workers and employers at its Mexican production site shielded the Beetle itself from blemish. Reports of conflict-ridden industrial relations could have tarnished the product with the stigma of exploitation. As a result of silence about developments in Mexico, the Beetle retained its iconic shine.
CONCLUSION: OF BEETLES AND LOCUSTS
Of course, it would be wrong to attribute the Beetle's persistent prominence in the Federal Republic solely to wilful media neglect of Volkswagen's strong-arm tactics in Mexico. The decision to concentrate Beetle production in Mexico in 1978 had already taken the car out of the West German limelight, and company practices in Mexico were on the whole of little interest to the German media. Transfer of Beetle production to Puebla came on the heels of a profound crisis at Wolfsburg which culminated in mass lay-offs; it also coincided with the onset of the Oil Crisis, the rise of environmental concerns and long-term mass unemployment. 78 As its production in Germany ceased, the Beetle began to seem like a thing of the past, from a time when expansion and full employment had characterized the Federal Republic. The commercial success of the Beetle's successor, the new Golf model, underscored this break. Of course, the Golf was no symbol of a country in crisis. On the contrary, it gained such prominence in the 1980s that, by the turn of the millennium, a witty best-seller by Florian Ilies declared its author's membership of 'generation Golf', an age cohort born between 1965 and 1975 which grew up in a country allegedly as boringly stable as the Beetle's successor. 79 More expensive, safer and faster than the Beetle, the Golf became the transport of the prosperous, economically secure middle class in a Federal Republic in which consumerism developed dynamically as mass joblessness persisted and grew especially among manual workers. The Golf, then, stood for a rich country with recalcitrant problems in its labour market.
In (re-)united Germany, the Beetle has come to be regarded as a historical commodity which nonetheless holds important lessons for the present. During hot debates about welfare reforms in 2005, President Horst Ko¨hler weighed in with a speech that opened on the following note:
Germany has become unfaithful to itself. For a long time, we have neglected the recipe of success that brought the Federal Republic optimism and affluence, stability and prestige after the war. Those were times when no one yet spoke of globalization, but the Beetle ran all over the world -and ran and ran and ran. At that time, the Federal Republic was characterized by an order that encouraged achievement and social progress. 80 Part of a chorus demanding welfare cuts, Ko¨hler's speech encouraged workers and employees to become more like the undemanding, reliable and tough Beetle in order to build a better future on the virtues of the past. In effect, the President praised the little car as a role model to recapture past growth and make the Federal Republic again what it once had been.
Ko¨hler's address highlights both explicit and tacit assumptions that continue to lend the Beetle public prominence in the Federal Republic. To begin with, this automobile retains its status as an embodiment of the qualities that supposedly made a successful postwar order. As a result of its cheapness, robustness and dependability, the vehicle emerged soon after 1945 as a symbol of a reliable postwar normality characterized by increasing prosperity. As an unpretentious product, it spoke of the solidity of a public order that satisfied consumer demands that had been illusory before 1945. While the Beetle became a postwar icon partly because the Federal Republic, in advancing mass motorization, fulfilled what had remained an empty dream under the Nazis, it gained a stable, lasting association with normality during the Federal Republic's consolidation phase. Due to its rise to fame in a period of expanding prosperity and full employment, the car also evokes a benign chapter of Western capitalism. As a symbol of postwar normality, the Beetle continues to hold up to the German public a socio-economic promise from the past that, since the advent of mass unemployment in the mid 1970s, has remained frustrated for decades. Yet German speakers who extol the car as a role model overlook the fact that the Beetle's success unfolded under atypical circumstances, which are highly unlikely to return. Many Germans refuse to acknowledge that, as the historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler has noted, the quadrupling of average earnings between 1950 and 1973 occurred in 'an absolutely exceptional situation in modern global economic history'. 81 As it derives much of its symbolic energy from a desire for a normality that evolved in an altogether unusual phase in history, the Beetle combines both nostalgic and utopian dimensionsnostalgic because it indirectly speaks of lost social prospects and utopian because it refuses to accept this loss.
That similar tensions run through the Beetle as a symbol of Germany's place in the world is borne out by Ko¨hler's remark that no one spoke of 'globalization' in the car's heyday. At the height of the 'export miracle' in the 1950s and 1960s, West Germans considered the Beetle their unofficial representative on the international scene. The sympathy which greeted the car abroad signalled to them that the Federal Republic had gained acceptance within an international, American-led order that assigned their country a secondary role. While no one may have talked of 'globalization' at the time, the process subsequently labelled as such was already in full flow, and among its main beneficiaries and promoters were West Germany and its corporations. The circumstance that Volkswagen developed into a powerful multinational company with production sites in Latin America left no imprint on the Beetle's iconography in Germany, however. Put differently, the car conveys none of the ways in which, beyond developing exports, German companies (and the government) have contributed to the shaping of a global economy. Neither does the car speak of the considerable power Volkswagen can wield in global markets. The Beetle is thus well suited to portray the Federal Republic as mostly a passive bystander rather than an active champion of globalization. Many observers have recently taken this self-characterization one step further by painting their country as a prey of global economic developments. A storm of approval, for instance, met Social Democrat Franz Mu¨ntefering in 2005 when he denounced foreign investors as locusts that descended upon German companies like a biblical plague, leaving behind them ruin and despair in the form of unemployment. 82 These depictions of the 'export world champion' as a helpless victim of foreign financial invaders take up messages which the Beetle has conveyed for decades. As a picture of international economic innocence, this car does not disturb the self-image of the Federal Republic as a secondary country which refuses to flex its muscle on the international scene but owes its global presence to hard work and a dedication to quality.
The Beetle still carries many of the meanings that first turned it into an icon in West Germany in the 1950s and 1960s. It retains its association with quality and durability, conveys prospects of socio-economic expansion and underpins portrayals of unified Germany as a minor international player. Beyond its sales figures, there appears little that is exceptional about the vehicle -and that is exactly the source of its continuing appeal. As a symbol of postwar normality, it conveys a very flattering picture of Germany: peaceful, likeable and small. Its lasting prominence as a national symbol illustrates how far the German public has detached itself from the power fantasies of the twentieth century's first half. At the same time, its continuing appeal also speaks of the difficulties Germans encounter in acknowledging prominent features of the present they inhabit, namely accepting life in a unified nation that, despite mass unemployment, exerts considerable international economic power. When they think of the Beetle, Germans have no need to ponder these aspects of normality.
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